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Abstract
This paper studies a two sector endogenous growth model in which the 
governmentintervenes in the economy by financing research and education. 
We characterize both the balanced growth path and the transitional 
dynamics of the model showing the steady-state equilibrium to be a saddle 
point. We also show that while income taxation is distortive,a Pareto 
optimal outcome can be reached by means of a consumption tax in the 
decentralized setting.
A previous version of this paper was presented in October 1993 at the 
Macroeconomics Workshop at the EUI; I wish to thank the participants and 























































































































































































This paper studies a two reproducible factors model of government 
investment spending and taxation. The model offers insights into the role 
of the public sector in generating the conditions for growth, in 
particular regarding the accumulation of knowledge through scientific 
research and of human capital through education.
In the model one of the factors (physical capital) is a stockpile of 
the consumption good and is privately produced while the other (which can 
be taken to represent disembodied or embodied knowledge) is publicly 
produced, its production being financed through tax revenue.
If we assume this second factor to be disembodied knowledge, we 
have, in fact, a public research model which extends the presentation by 
Helpman-Grossman (1991) of the classic contribution by Shell (1967). The 
essential idea in the model is that the creation of knowledge is not 
always the byproduct of other activities, as in "learning by doing" 
models of growth (see Arrow 1962, Sheshinski 1967, Romer 1986) but, in 
contrast , can be fostered by increasing the allocation of economic 
resources explicitly devoted to inventive activity. Since knowledge is 
non rivalrous so that its competitive price is zero, this diversion 
invites and often requires an active public role(particularly if we 
consider the problem of exclusion).* To quote Shell: "Historically 
intervention on behalf of inventive activity has taken two basic forms: 
first, the establishment of a legal device, the patent, designed to 
bestow property rights on certain of the outputs of the inventive 
process. The second form of intervention is that of direct nonmarket
*An input in a production process can be defined to be non rivalrous if 
its use in one activity does not reduce the amount available for other 
activities. A good is non excludable if people cannot be prevented from 
using it. Both basic science and applied science are non rivalrous: 
Pythagoras’ theorem as well as a metallurgical formula or a chip design, 
once discovered, can be used at zero marginal cost by anyone. In an 
economy in which technical ideas are commodities, the basic premises of 
classical welfare economics are violated and the optimality of the 
competitive mechanisms is not assured. This analysis of the public good 
characteristics of knowledge in the Shell paper has been developed 
recently by P. Romer, who investigates the link between non rivalry of 




























































































support of research and development. Universities have long played such a 
role in Western economies. In the United States, the Department of 
Agriculture has undertaken research activities since its inception. The 
Department of Commerce has initiated industrial research programs 
modelled after the agricultural research stations. The Department of
Defence often uses the device of contracting research to private
2 3enterprises on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis." ’
The main differences between the treatment offered here and that of 
Helpman and Grossman are that we remove the restrictive assumption of 
identical production functions in the two sectors and assume a more 
general form for consumers preferences. Moreover we fully characterize 
the transitional dynamics of the model, while they limit themselves to
offer an heuristic argument for the convergence of the system to the 
4steady state which seems to be valid for the logarithmic specification 
of preferences they assume. Finally we also analyse the model from a 
normative point of view, showing that the command economy solution can be 
decentralized if a consumption tax rather than an income tax is imposed.
If we interpret the second factor as human capital we are in effect 
working in the Uzawa (1965)- Lucas (1988) tradition. The main development 
in this direction is that we model education as being a public not a
5private concern, which is generally consistent with the facts.
2From Shell (1967) p. 70. He also mentions as grounds for public 
intervention the extreme riskiness that characterizes the inventive
process at the microeconomic level.
3As regards the first kind of intervention mentioned by Shell, we recall 
that models of imperfect competition and R & D where firms enjoy 
monopoly power after having developed a prototype of a good are an 
important stream of the endogenous growth literature ( see for example 
Romer (1987, 1989b), Grossman - Helpman (1991) chaps. 3 and 4). However " 
a larger proportion of the generic knowledge relevant to a technology is 
written down, published in journals, discussed at national and
international meetings" (Nelson-Wright 1992, p.1958), i.e. is non
excluded.
4 .Following the literature but aware of committing an abuse de
langage", we define "steady state" as a situation in which
variables grow at a constant rate.
5 From a prescriptive point of view, even if human capital as embodied 
knowledge is rival and excludable, the important externalities it 




























































































When seen as a contribution to the public finance literature, our 
model enriches the taxonomy put forward by Barro (1989) and Barro and 
Sala i Martin (1990), whose analysis is limited to one capital good 
models, while the difference from Rebelo (1990) and King and Rebelo 
(1990) is that it is assumed in these papers that government revenue is 
used to finance the provision of goods that do not affect the production 
possibilities of the private sector.
The model delivers persistent growth, whose engine is shown to be 
public activity, without which the return to physical capital would 
progressively decline, so discouraging private saving. Since we assume 
constant returns to the reproducible factors, their sustained
accumulation could be anticipated on the basis of what we already know 
about growth models.
A distinctive feature of the model is that we ane able to show that 
the steady-state equilibrium is a saddle point and to analyse the 
chELracterist ics of the transition to the steady state. This is 
panticularly interesting because the transitional dynaunics of two sector
models of endogenous growth have been fully described only in panticular 
6cases.
It is of course important to study the dynaunics outside the 
steady-state, since if it is not possible to establish stability of the
considerations for public education seem to be particulanly important in 
the light of the results of endogenous growth models. In fact one 
implication of such models is that, coeteris paribus, the initial 
distribution in human and non human wealth tends to perpetuate itself, 
being transmitted down from parents to children, leading to persistent 
income inequality, even in models in which the utility of children enter 
the utility function of parents.
As is well known, other grounds for public education arise in a 
stochastic context: the incompleteness of capital markets makes it 
impossible to share the risk of human capital accumulation and the 
imperfection of credit markets makes it impossible to borrow to pay for 
it.g A numerical study of the dynamics outside the steady state is offered 
for a two sector model of endogenous growth with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, whose steady state properties are studied, for instance, in 
Rebelo (1990) is due to Mulligan and Sala i Martin (1992). The transition 
to the steady state for this model is worked out analytically in chap 4 
of Barro and Sala i Martin (1993), for the case in which the production 
function is the saune in the two sectors auid for the case in which the 
production function of one good is linear in that good, that is the 





























































































balanced growth path, and to rule out long adjustment times in the face 
of shocks such as a change in the parameters or an exogenous reduction in 
stocks, the characteristics of the steady state configuration become 
largely irrelevant for any applied or policy analysis and the emphasis on 
asymptotic rates of growth seems unwarranted.
The investigation of the transitional dynamics starts with the 
definition of new variables which are constant in steady state and which 
transforms the model into a stationary one where the dynamics are more 
amenable to analysis. We are also then able to analyse the behaviour of 
the system when linearized around the steady state showing that it has 
two real roots of opposite sign, yielding the saddle point stucture.
Moving to normative aspects we compare the decentralized outcomes in 
our model with the Pareto optimal solution, which would be chosen by a 
"social planner" directly operating the technology of the economy. We 
show that with an income tax there is no way to attain the command 
optimum, which can however be reached by imposing a consumption tax.
2. A Two Factor Model of Growth with an Income Tax
To keep the analysis simple and highlight the questions of interest,
several simplifying assumptions are used. The first is that the
7population and the supply of labour are both constant. This rules out an 
analysis of fertility, labour force participation, or variation in hours 
worked per worker. The other simplifying assumptions relate to factor 
intensities. We assume that physical capital can be accumulated as
This "elasticity optimism" regarding labour supply, as it is labeled in 
the public finance literature, is endemic among endogenous growth 
theorists. In fact leisure cannot grow in steady state so the income and 
substitution effect associated with substained growth in labor 
productivity must not alter labour supply. This can be shown to happen 
for two classes of time separable preferences over leisure and 
consumption. In the first class instantaneous felicity takes the form :
u(C, 1)=C* °v(l)/l-<r, <r > 0,or for <r= 1, u(C, 1 )=log(C)+v( 1)
where v(.) must be increasing and concave if <r ^ 1 and increasing and 
convex if <r > 1. In the second class we have: u(C, 1H), where 1 is 
leisure and H is a reproducible capital good (e.g. human capital) and the 
function is concave and homogeneous of degree b. For the first class see 




























































































forgone output which means that capital goods are produced with the same 
technology as the final output.
The production function of the tangible commodity is:
y=a i :1- V e j (2.DI K  K
where A is a scale factor, K and L are capital and labour employed in 1 k k
the sector and E can be read as representing the stock of scientific 
ideas or the level of human capital. In both cases its increase leads tog
Harrod neutral, i.e. labour augmenting technological progress.
Knowledge is assumed to accumulate according to:
E = A K * " V  E132 E E ( 2 . 2 )
where K£ and L£ are labour and capital employed in producing E (Research 
and Development or Education), while is another scale factor.
The level of productivity increases with the cumulative output of 
the research sector because the results of research are freely available.
When employing the interpretation of E as education we assume that all
gworkers learn at the same rate. In the representative agent framework, 
in which the endogenous growth literature has been developed, this 
assumption is not restrictive but it may be in more general and realistic 
models. The government taxes all incomes at the exogenous rate’t’and uses 
the revenues to finance expenses. We therefore have:
We recall that Harrod-neutral technical progress implies that if the 
ratio between capital and labour measured in efficiency units is 
constant, then the factor shares are constant. We can add that it 
implies that when the ratio between output and capital is constant then 
the marginal productivity of capital is constant. Unless technological 
change is Harrod neutral, one sector models generally cannot approach an 
equilibrium balanced growth path that is economically meaningful, i.e. 
that is not in conflict with stylized facts (see, e.g. Burmeister and 
Dobell 1970). 
g For ease of exposition, from now on, we will call E education and will 




























































































(wL + rK) t (2.3)
where w is the wage, r the interest rate, L = Le + and K = + Kr. 
Notice that (2.3) constrains the government to run a balanced budget. 
That is the government can neither finance deficits by issuing debt nor 
run surpluses by accumulating assets. Profit maximization by firms 
imposes equality between marginal products and rental rates of factors so 
we have :
r = (l-r)AK y(LE)r (2.4)
w = r A K1_T L3r_1E9r (2.5)I K  K
We have assumed no depreciation occurs so the user cost of capital is 
equal to the interest rate. Notice that the representative producer 
assumes that changes in her quantity of output do not lead to any change 
in the amount of public services. Assuming public agencies apply the 
principle of cost minimization we also have:
r/w = (1-0ÎL/0K. = (l-r)L/r Kk (2.6)
Again the subscripts refer to the sector in which the factors are 
employed. We write, to simplify notation, L^= x L and Kk= <p K. We also 
normalize labour force to one.
Using (2.3) and (2.6) we get to:
<P = (t-i)/(0-r)d-r)'1t -l) (2.7)
x = r(t-i)/((r-p)t-y) (2.8 )
An immediate result is therefore that the proportion of each factor 




























































































depend on the capital/ labour ratio in the economy, and that it is 
increasing in the tax rate. We also have that the proportion of labour 
(capital) used in each sector relative to the total supply is increasing 
in the labour (capital) share in the sector.
We can rewrite the law of motion of accumulated knowledge as:
E/E = B^K/E)1"̂  (2.9)
where B5 = 0-1 )t/( O-y) t -(1-y)) )*~^(-0t/( (y-0)t-y) /
The intertemporal budget constraint families face at time zero is:
J'(C(s)-w(s) ( 1-t )-r(s) ( 1-t )W)exp J'-r(v)dvds 
o o
(2.10)
where W is family wealth. Assuming CES preferences :
U = I ° V ptC1~<r/(l-o-)dt 0 < O- < 1 or or > 1 11 (2.11)o o
we obtain the following Euler condition:
C/C -(p - r( 1-t ) )<r ( 2 . 1 2 )
This simply says that the rate of consumption growth will be positive as 
long as the marginal rate of substitution of present for future 
consumption is lower than the marginal rate of transformation.
Using (2.4), (2.5) and the expressions found for x and <P< we write:
In fact we have: 3#/3t< 0, dx/dt < 0, d<p/dfi > 0, 3%/33 <0, d<t>/df < 0,
> 0 .




























































































r = B K~yEy (2.13)
w = y(B2/(l-r)),-1/V /r K*~yEy (2.14)
where B =A ( 1-y) (r (0-r )t-jr( l-jr) )y ( ( 1-y) (r-0) t - y(l-y)) y
Substituting these expression in the dynamic budget constraint of 
families and noting that in equilibrium aggregate wealth must be equal to 
aggregate physical capital we have the following equation of motion for 
capital :
K/K =(l-t)B (E/K)y- C/K 3 (2.15)
where B = B/((y-£)t +l-y)) 3 2
From (2.12) and (2.13) we get:
C/C= -p/o- +(l-t)B2(E/K)yo-_1 (2.16)
2.1 The Steady State Solution
One major fact of economic development is that national growth rates do 
not display long run trends so steady state models can be interpreted as 
a reasonable first approximation to reality.
An important step in the analysis is therefore to consider if a 
steady state solution exists and what are its characteristics. 
Differentiating (2.9) and (2.15) it is clear that in steady-state, the 
rate of increase of knowledge will be equal to the rate of increase of 
capital and of consumption. We indicate this common rate of growth by g. 




























































































state ratio of knowledge to capital in terms of the steady state rate of
growth. We then substitute the ratio in (2.9), getting the following
12implicit expression for the steady state rate of growth:
(/3-i )/y
g = Bi((g<r + p )/(l-t)Bz) (2.1.1)
To interpret (2.1.1) we can use Fig. 1. The curve g represents the left 
hand side of (2.1.1), G the right hand side. The curves will always 
intersect for one positive value of g, i.e. the rate of growth will be 
positive and unique. We have in fact:
(1^ )/y -l (B-r-1)/7G’ (g) =Bi(Bz(l-t)) (0-l)0T Mger + p T P 7 11/7 < 0
(1"3)/y 2 - 2  (B-27-1 )/vG (g) « B ^ a - t ) )  0-1 )<rr (/3-r-l)(gcr + p T P 2y lj/r > 0
lim G(g) = +oo 
g-M)+
lim G(g) = 0
g->+00
The explanation for sustained growth in this economy is that research 
allows a technological progress which keeps the marginal product of 
physical capital from falling to the level of the subjective discount 
rate p. As can be seen from (2.1.1) the long run rate of growth is 
affected by changes in both economic structure through <r, p, , Ag> /3, 
y and public policy, through t. Going back to the original parameters we 
have:
Of course, we could calculate the ratio from 2.9 and substitute it in
2. 16, thus obtaining a different expression, which, however, would 





























































































G = i-/3)< C O-y)t + y)
For example an increase in the subjective discount rate p or in the 
elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption <r implies that the G 
curve shifts down, so that the equilibrium growth rate decreases. It 
falls because consumers, being less patient or less willing to substitute 
consumption intertemporally save less. Lower capital per capita means 
lower income and a reduced tax base to finance research.
Now consider the long run implication of a variation in the tax 
rate. We have G = 0 for t=0 and t=l. In fact the function is first 
increasing then decreasing in t, as can be seen by calculating:
a / a t ( ( t ( i - t ) 1 ‘ p/ o - y ) t + y ) = ( i - t ) u ' p ' T , / y ( ( r - p ) t 2- 2 y t + y ) ( r + 0 - r ) t ) ' z
The sign of this function is the same, for 0 < t < 1, as that of:
This parabola has one positive root lower than unity and another root 
which can be discarded because if y < 0 it is bigger than unity and if y 
> 0 it is negative. The economically significant root, which is the value 
of the tax rate that maximizes the rate of growth is:
For values of t smaller than this root the function takes positive 
values, for bigger values it takes negative values. If we are in the 
interval in which it is positive(negative), an increase in t will shift 






























































































rate of growth. The economic intuition is that when the tax rate is low, 
an increase in it will increase tax receipts so allowing the government 
to finance more research. This will prevent capital productivity from 
falling and so indirectly encourage saving and capital accumulation . 
However, when t is very high a further increase will reduce tax receipts, 
by discouraging saving : the lower capital per capita implies a lower 
income i.e. a smaller tax base . We have a form of the Laffer curve 
effect at work here and in fact a particular powerful one because it 
influences the growth rate and has therefore compound effects. It must be 
underlined however that the reason for the inverse relationship between
tax rate and tax receipts is not the work discouragement effect on which
13the literature about the Laffer curve focuses.
Notice that if y = 0, the "Helpman - Grossman hypothesis", which is in
fact acceptable if we interpret E as being disembodied knowledge, t =
1/2, while if we assume 0 = 1, the "Lucas hypothesis", which is more
reasonable if we interpret E as being education, then t = 0.456,max
assuming a labour share of 0.7 and a capital share of 0.3 in the physical 
good sector. We also recall that total government budgets as share of GDP 
are close to these levels in most OECD countries.
2.2 Transitional Dynamics
We now turn to the analysis of transitional dynamics in this model and to 
the issue of stability. This is important since in general there will be 
an initial imbalance between the two reproducible factors i.e. the 
initial ratio between the stock of physical capital and the stock of 
knowledge will presumably be different from the one required for a steady 
state. It is natural then to ask if and how the economy will ever get to 
the steady state proportions. A first question to ask is how such 
imbalance will affect the saving rate. The stock of the relatively scarce 
factor could be increased either by substituting away from investment in 
the other factor or substituting away from consumption. Assuming that the
First reference on this literature would be the cocktail napkin on 
which Arthur Laffer first sketched the relationship between tax revenue 





























































































equilibrium is stable, investment could take place in both sectors and 
relatively more in the one producing the relatively scarce capital good 
or it could be positive only in the scarce factor so that the model 
behaves as a one capital good model until the steady state is reached. 
Alternatively the model could be unstable in the sense that investment is 
higher in the factor that is relatively more abundant.
The first step in our analysis is to define two new variables e and 
c, which are constant in the steady-state, the first being the ratio
between the stock of education capital E and the stock of physical
14capital K and the second being the ratio between consumption and K.
We have, by subtracting, member by member, 2.15 from respectively 
2. 9 and 2.16:
e/e = B e0'1 - (l-t)B er + c 1 3 ( 2 . 2 . 1 )
c/c=-p/cr+( 1-t )B2eT( (y-plt+l-jr-o-) Jo-'1 ((r-/3) t + l-y) _1+c (2.2.2)
We first analyse the e = 0 locus. Along it we have:
cl• = (l-t)B er - B ep_11 e=o 3 l
lime + 1e->o
l i m e *  = +oo•e=oe-»+co
dc/de [ • = (l-t)B re9'-1- B (/3-1 )eP"2 > 01 e = 0 3 2
In Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) terminology c is a




























































































1im dc/de • = 0♦ 1 e=oe-x>
1im dc/de I • = +»1 e=oe->+co
d2c /de2 I • = (l-t)B y(y-l)eT'2- B (p-1) ((3-2)e3"3 < 0•e=0 3 2
lim d2c/de2| • = 0i e=oe->+oo
So the locus will be upward sloping and strictly concave. Moreover its 
intercept on the horizontal axis will be positive and it will have a 
vertical asymptote at the origin.
Now consider the c = 0 locus. We have:
cl* = p/<r - xe* 'c=o
where x = ( 1-t )Bz( (y-£) t+l-y-<r) ( (y-pK+l-y ) 1cr 1
l i m e -  = per + 1 c=oe->o
lim c •1 c=oe->+co
-oo if x >0 
+oo if x <0
dc/deI• = - yxe^ 1■c=o
d2c/de2 I• = - y(y-l)xe* 21 c=o
If x is strictly positive (negative), the
15downward(upward)-sioping and strictly convex (concave).
curve is 
The vertical




























































































intercept is positive and both the first and the second derivatives go to 
zero as a goes to infinity.
The phase diagram for the case in which the c = 0 isocline is upward 
sloping is represented in Fig 2 .Everywhere above the dc/dt= 0 locus the 
consumption - capital ratio c is increasing : consumption is above the 
level that would just maintain c constant. Similarly c is decreasing at 
points below the dc/dt = 0 locus. As regards the de/dt = 0 locus we have 
that at points to the left of the de/dt = 0 locus the E/K ratio is 
increasing. Analogously, at every point to the right of the de/dt = 0 
locus that same ratio is decreasing. As usual the arrows shown in the 
figure indicate the directions of motion and we can see that we have a 
saddlepoint equilibrium. This implies that for each initial level of the 
capital goods there is a unique initial level in consumption consistent 
with convergence to the steady state. Convergence of c and e to the 
steady-state values is monotonic.
Notice that even if the de/dt = 0 and dc/dt = 0 loci are both upward 
sloping they cannot intersect twice or be tangent.
The first point is implied by the previously established uniqueness 
of the steady state rate of growth g. From 2.9 we see that the steady 
state value for e is also unique. Finally, substituting the steady state 
e into (2.2.1) or (2.2.2) we see that there is only one steady state c.
A tangency solution would require that when the two loci meet they 
have the same slope:
dc/deI• = dc/deI••e=o 'c=o
In fact we should have, substituting the expressions already found for 
these derivatives:
parameters. In fact B^ is positive and 3)t +l-y is positive. For
values of <r near or below unity, suggested by empirical estimates, the 
sign of x can be positive or negative. Coeteris paribus the higher is <r 
the smaller will be x. But even in particular cases, for example for y=/3 
or for £=1 it is not possible to sign x, without knowing precisely the 




























































































(l-t)B re* '-B 0-l)eP'2= (1-t )B2( (r-plt + l-y-o-) ((y-pjt+l-r) V  V e r 1
or, after reordering and simplifying, and recalling the relationship 
between B and B :3 2
B (U-l)eP"2 = (l-t)Bzr<r 1eT'1
This equation has no solution since, for all values of e, the expression 
on the left hand side is negative and that on the right hand side is 
positive.
In Fig. 3 the case is represented where the dc/dt = 0 locus is 
downward sloping. The diagram shows that we have a saddle point 
equilibrium in this case as well. The analysis of this case which can be 
conducted along lines analogous to those used previously is left to the 
reader.
2.3 The Saddle Point Equilibrium in the Linearized System
We now linearize the dynamic system in c and e around the steady state 
* * values e and c :
dc/dt c c (l-t)o- 1B2jr( (r-pjt+l-y-o-) ( (y-plt+l-y) ’e y 1 (c-c )
de/dt e* Bipe*^"-(l-t)(y+l)B3e*3r_1+ c* (e-e )
Recalling that along the da/dt= 0 locus we have:
-B • 0 - 1 .+(1-t)B e 3




























































































a =c*0-l)Bie*̂ '1-c*(l-t)yB3e*r((y-p)t+l-y) < 0
This confirms the conclusions reached by means of qualitative analysis 
that the equilibrium is a saddle point so that there is only one level 
of initial consumption that, given initial capital stocks is compatible 
with convergence to the steady state.
In the terminology of Blanchard-Kahn (1980) or Buiter (1990) the 
number of predetermined or backward- looking variables (i.e. e ) equals 
the number of stable roots of the characteristic equation of the 
homogenous system, and the number of non-predetermined, jump variables 
(i.e. c) equals the number of unstable roots. We have in fact a linear 
two-point boundary value problem with linear boundary conditions, where 
one boundary condition takes the familiar form of an initial condition 
for the predetermined variable and the other is obtained from the 
terminal condition that the system should be convergent.
3. Normative issues.
Having established the existence, uniqueness and stability of the 
steady-state solution, we now move on to assess the externalities implied 
by public expenditure and taxation, which lead to which the decentralized 
choices generating outcomes that are not Pareto optimal. The easiest way 
to do so is to compare the decentralized equilibrium with the solution to 
a planning problem in which the government dictates the accumulation 
rates of the capital goods and the consumption choices over time.
3.1 The Command Economy
We assume the social planner maximizes the representative 
household’s welfare, described by (2.11), subject to the constraints:




























































































This is a well known two sector model with a linearly homogeneous 
Cobb-Douglas technology, so we can be brief.16 The FOC’s are:
c " r-  0  (3 . 1 . 3 )
e i Ai ( i - y ) 0 ‘ y K1-,r(x E ) ,r= e  A Kl ~ P ( i - t ) ~ p ( i - 0 ) ( ( i - x l E ) fi ( 3 . 1 . 4 )
where 0 and 0 are the costate variables relative to the states K and 1 2
E.
01 Ai ( )  1'TEy yzy "1=ezA2 (K( 1 ■-ip))1 (1 ■-%) (3.1.5)
0i=pei-0iAi01*yK-y(l-T)(xE)y-(l-3)e2A2(l-0)1_P((l-z)E/K)3 (3. 1.6)
e  =pa - e  a  (^K)1_Tjrxy Ay_1-  02az (k ( i - 0 ) / a ) 1_0 ( i - j: ) ^  ( 3 . 1 . 7 )
Dividing (3.1.4) by (3.1.5) member by member we obtain :
7<t> Ai-r)z (3.1.8)
From (3.1.1) and (3.1.2), considering that 0 and % must be constant in
steady state, we have that in steady state the rate of growth of
*knowledge and physical capital must be the same which we indicate by g . 
Totally differentiating (3.1.4) we see that in steady-state:
0 / 0  = 0 / 0  (3.1.9)
1 1  2 2



























































































Substituting (3.1.4) in (3.1.6) and (3.1.7), we have:
e /e »p -  Ai (i-r)(E*/0K)r (3.1.10)
02/02= P ' PA2(K(1-^)/(1-z )E)1‘P (3.1.11)
Since in steady state the left hand side of (3.1.10) and (3.1.11) Eire 
equal we deduce that:
A1(l-y)(EZ/0K)y = A2/3((l-0)K/(l-z)E)1'f3 (3.1.12)
From (3.1.3) and (3.1.10) we get to:
C/C = (-P + A^ (l-y) (Ey/0K)y )<r-1 (3.1.13)
Using (3.1.8) and (3.1.12) to calculate Ey/^K, we then find:
g*=-pa-1 + ( ( A 2)lr(y(l-p))Jf(l-r)1-yAi)(1-p,)1/<1+y-p V - 1 (3.1.14)
We therefore have that the steady state rate of growth is higher the more 
patient and the more willing consumers are to substitute consumption 
intertemporally
3.2. Comparison between the Command and the Market Economy
It is easy to show that it is not possible to find an income tax rate 
path which gives a Pareto optimal equilibrium.
For ease of exposition we consider the case in which /3 = y and limit 
ourselves to the steady state configuration. In the command economy we 




























































































(3.1.13) and (3.1.14) as:
K =Ai«K1'yEr - C (3.2.1)
E=A (l-0)K1"yEy 2 (3.2.2)
C/C = - ( p - Ai(l-y)(E/K)y )<r'1 (3.2.3)
g =f -p/o- +(Aj ( 1—y ) )1 y ( A^y )ycr 1 (3.2.4)
We note that in steady state we have:
1-0 = g*(Ai(l-r)/A2ï)1"y/A2 (3.2.5)
Considering the market economy, we have that in the case = y (2.15), 
(2.9) and (2.16) become:
K =Ai(l-t)K1'yEy - C (3.2.6)
E = A tK1_yEy (3.2.7)
2
C/C =-( p - Ai(l-y)(l-t)(E/K)y )<r'1 (3.2.8)
If we compare the equations of motion describing the decentralized 
economy with those relative to the command economy we see that due to the 
presence of the tax (3.2.3) is different from (3.2.8), so that there is 
no way, given the tax system, to reproduce the optimal program in the 
market economy. The point is that the income tax is distorting since it 
drives a wedge between the social and the private return on investment. 
On the other hand if t=0 we have a no-growth steady state equilibrium, 




























































































What can be done is to impose a tax rate such that , in steady 
state, the command economy and the market economy grow at the same rate. 
Recalling that in steady state all variables grow at the same rate g, we 
have from (3.2.7):
K/E = (g/A2t)1 / W  (3.2.9)
Substituting (3.2.9) in (3.2.8), we have:
g =(-p +Ai(l-r)(l-t)(g/A2t)y/1‘y )<r 1 (3.2.10)
It could then be possible to construct a taxation path in such a way that 
g is equal to the balanced growth path of the command economy, 
(provided, of course, this equation has a solution for 0 < t < 1 ). 
However in general, this solution will be different from 1 -<p, given by 
(3.2.5). Then from (3.2.2) and (3.2.7), the ratio between the stocks of 
the capital goods, and, from (3.2.1) and (3.2.6), the ratio between the 
stock of physical capital and consumption will be different in the two 
economies. This means that, for given Kq, i.e. physical capital at time 
0, Cq, consumption at time 0, will be different from the optimal level 
Cq*. But this implies from the definition of the optimum that even when 
the optimal growth rate is achieved with an income tax, the level of 
households’ welfare will be lower in the decentralized equilibrium.
4. A Consumption Tax Model
In this section we show that the command optimum can be attained in a 
decentralized setting if the government revenue is obtained through a 
consumption tax rather than an income tax, a result analogous to those 
reached in different settings by, for instance, Barro (1990) and Rebelo 
(1990) . The economic intuition for the equivalence between a consumption 
tax and a lump-sum tax is that, since leisure is exogenous in this model, 
a consumption tax does not alter any incentive the agents face, i.e. does 




























































































decision of consuming now versus later.
To prove this formally we show below that the equations 
characterizing the steady state in the command economy will be equal to 
those characterizing the market economy, provided the tax rate is choosen 
optimally.
Our results apply to the the steady - state; although it should be 
possible to analyse the transitional dynamics of this version of the 
model along the same lines used to study the income tax model above, 
this is not attempted here.
We begin by considering that, if all revenue comes from a 
consumption tax the government budget constraint will be:
Ct = rK + wL (4.1)E E
where t is now the consumption tax rate. This can be rewritten, noticing 
that (2.4) and (2.5) still hold, since the conditions of profit 
maximization are not affected by the fiscal regime, as:
17
Ct= Aiy(«K)1'ar(Ez)T (l-z)/te (4.2)
The budget constraint of families is:
W = rW + w - (l+t)C (4.3)
Recalling that in the aggregate K = W, and again using (2.4) and (2.5) 
the equation of motion of physical capital becomes:
Notice that if leisure were endogenized by considering utility 
functions consistent with steady state growth (i.e. belonging to the 
kinds mentioned in note 7) it is very likely, even if it is not shown 
analytically here , that a consumption tax would still be equivalent to a 
lump sum tax. The same cancelation of income and substitution effects 





























































































K /K  = A ÿ 1" arK "r (E x )ï  -  C/K (4 .4 )
while, keeping CES preferences, the Euler conditions imply:
C/C =-( p - Ai(l-y)(EZ/Kÿ)r)<r"1 (4.5)
Cost minimization by public agencies imposes:
7<t> /(l-y)x =0(W)/(1-0)(1-*) (4.6)
while the accumulation of the non material asset is described by:
E = A2(K(l-0)),'fJ((l-*)E)f3 (4.7)
In the steady state the rates of growth of E, K, C are easily seen to be
the same, so that the equations (4.2), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) car be
18solved for the five unknowns C/K, E/K, 0, x> g- Now we have that these
equations , apart from the first, also characterise the command economy.
This can be seen by comparing them to equations (3.1.1), (3.1.2), (3.1.8)
and (3.1.10), that, together with (3.1.12), determine the optimal steady 
* * * * *state (C/K), E/K, <f>, %• g- To determine the optimal tax rate one can then 
simply substitute <p, x » (C/K) and (E/K), in (4.2). We find:
t*= *0(i-x*)/((i-r)(r(i-0)- (i-r)J3x*/(i-x*))+/3(i-|3)z*
while:
= l-g*{A;yA f 1(l-y)U -p,<Sf-1,(y(l-3)/p)(p-1)y),1*,"P)
The transversality conditions will then be used to calculate the 





























































































We have analysed a two factor model in which public policy, by inducing 
knowledge accumulation, works as the engine of sustained growth. While
endogenous growth models generally are solved only for the balanced 
19growth path, we have been able to fully characterize the transitional 
dynamics of the model, which we show to be globally saddle path stable. 
Coming to policy implications from the analysis: we show that while a
Pareto optimum cannot be achieved in the steady state with an income 
tax it can with a consumption tax.
This work is only a beginning and many further developments are 
possible. The first direction of further research would be to calibrate 
the model and simulate the impact of tax changes on the rate of growth. 
Another route would be to look at the empirical implications of the 
theory for relations between the size of investment expenditure by the 
government, in particular in research and education, and the rate of 
growth. Notice that since the analysis applies not only to steady state 
paths an empirical investigation could look at differences in 
performances across countries in the short run and not only simply at 
averages calculated over long periods of time. Other theoretical 
questions that could be asked starting from the model studied here are, 
for instance, whether the command optimum is attainable outside the 
steady state by resort to a consumption tax, and what are the effects of 
debt financing. Another experiment could also be conducted assuming that 
the government is not benevolent but, for instance, wants to maximize its 
own revenue.
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